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France has a long-standing and “explicit” family poli-
cy that is overseen by government institutions and the
subject of official reports produced annually.The “fam-
ily” as such is legally recognised as an institution that
plays an important role in the maintenance of social
cohesion. The appointment of a minister responsible
for family issues demonstrates the importance given to
this issue.
French family policy involves a rich array of cash ben-
efits and services. It also stands out, along with the
Scandinavian countries,for its strong support of mater-
nal employment. In a similar vein, France leads the
European Union in public childcare provision and ben-
efits aimed at reducing child care costs for families.As
a matter of fact, the progressive arrival of mothers on
the labour market since the 1970s has,through an inter-
active process, prompted family policy to introduce a
whole range of services for parents in paid employ-
ment which in turn have enabled a growing number of
mothers to have access to jobs.It has also helped to put
the question of “social care”(Daly and Lewis 2000) for
dependents firmly onto the policy agenda.
In the first section, the institutional and historical con-
text will be presented. I shall highlight, in particular,
the dynamic of the interactions at play between this
policy and female employment behaviour since the
1970s. Second, I will demonstrate that although the
French welfare state is often characterised as a conser-
vative,corporatist welfare regime in most cross-nation-
al research (Arts and Gelissen 2002), it differs when
child care and public support for working mothers are
taken into account. In conclusion, I shall comment on
what is currently at stake in French family policy.
Family policy in France since 1945: brief historical
and institutional background
A special branch of the social security administra-
tion, created in 1945, is devoted to family policy.The
principal administration is carried out by the
National Family Allowance Fund (Caisse Nationale
des Allocations Familiales, CNAF), which covers
more than 90 percent of all recipient families.
Theoretically, the social partners (including family
organisations) represented on the Executive Board
of the CNAF periodically determine the orientations
of the different areas for intervention in family poli-
cy. In practice, decisions are made by the govern-
ment, whether approved or not by the Executive
Board of the CNAF.It is solely at the local level,and
only when assistance to and measures in favour of
families are required, that the Executive Boards of
the CAFs (local Family Allowance Funds) have any
real decision-making power,and in particular,a mar-
gin for manoeuvre in the provision and development
of childcare services.
The resources allocated to the family branch of social
security continue to remain close to the European av-
erage. In the early 2000s, France earmarked approx-
imately 10 percent of welfare expenditure for “fami-
lies/children”.In the eighties,more than 90 percent of
the resources allocated to the family sector were pro-
vided by contributions paid by employers. Over the
last decade, the funding structure has undergone a
profound transformation with an increase in the pro-
portion represented by ear marked taxes and state
budget spending.
Family allowances (Allocations familiales, correspond-
ing to Kindergeld) represent the main cash benefit
scheme.A law passed in 1975 extended its payment to
all families: parents no longer needed to be in work,
thus breaking with the principle of insurance-related
benefits. The  Allocations familiales are not income-
related and not taxable. In accordance with a long-
standing historical natalist approach, and despite con-
stant demands from family organisations,families with
only one child are denied family allowances.However,
in line with one of the goals of family policy to reduce
child poverty, families with one child are entitled to a
means-tested benefit if the child is aged under three
years (Commaille, Strobel and Villac 2002).
Family policy still bears the traces of earlier history;
its system of transfers (family allowances, means-
tested benefits and “quotient familial”) follows a
long-established natalist and familialist tradition and
continues to favour large families (with three or more
children). Its main objective is to partly compensate
for the financial cost of having children. Tax law
favours couples, whether married or not, with chil-
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dren.The aim is horizontal redistribution (from those
with no children to those with children), an objective
still supported by numerous politicians at both ends
of the political spectrum.
The “quotient familial”operates as follows:within this
family-based splitting system, the number of children
is taken into account in calculating the tax liability,the
total household income is divided by the number of
family members,the relevant and progressive tax rate
is applied to this income per adult equivalent (one
“share”for an adult,one “half-share”for the first and
second children, one “share” for the third and subse-
quent children),and the resultant sum then multiplied
by the number of family members. At the same
income level,a family with three children will pay less
than a family with only one child. This tax system is
frequently subject to criticism by trade unions and
leftist political parties arguing that it should be limit-
ed to vertical redistribution, as it is in Sweden.
Contrary to the pension system, no retrenchment
measures have recently been implemented in the
family policy branch of the social security system
(Palier 2002). This mirrors the salience of family-
related issues in the social and political agenda.This
also reflects the fact that the family branch and its
large network of Local Allowance Funds (CAFs) are
responsible for the management of welfare state
provisions.The family branch is a transfer-heavy sys-
tem which also aims at reducing social inequalities
and fighting against poverty. For instance CAFs pro-
vide more than one million households with the Mini-
mum Income Benefit (RMI) introduced in 1988.These
measures are successful in reducing the poverty rate
among families, in particular lone parent families.
Despite the dramatic increase since the nineties in
the number of welfare recipients, no real welfare-to-
work programmes have been adopted.
The progressive entry of women into the workforce:a
driver for change in family policy
Since the 1970s,against the background of an increase
in mothers’ labour force participation, the work/life
balance as an issue has gained increasing salience in
political life and has come to the forefront of the so-
cial policy agenda.Boundaries between state,families
and market have been redrawn, evidence that the
progressive entry of women into the workforce has
been a driver for change in the French welfare regime
(Fagnani 2000).
In the post-war years,the legislators were very much
concerned about the high infant mortality rate. In
order to encourage mothers to stay at home,couples
with at least two children were offered financial
incentives in the form of the “Allocation de Salaire
Unique” (Single Salary Allowance; Martin 1998).
Until the 1960s, France promoted the male bread-
winner model through generous assistance to fami-
lies where only the man was in paid work. However,
from the 1970s onwards, political mobilisation of
women and women’s organisations played a signifi-
cant role in demands for public child care facilities
and services.
Against this background, political actors were
inclined to win women’s votes on the basis of their
support for child care provision. In the context of an
acute labour shortage (there was a growing demand
for qualified women to occupy jobs in the tertiary
sector) policy-makers became increasingly receptive
to the arguments of early childhood specialists in
favour of crèches. For the first time, the programme
of the Sixth Plan tackled the issue of childcare pro-
vision: local Family Allowance Funds obtained addi-
tional funding to take partial responsibility for the
running costs of public childcare services, including
crèches, and to improve the quality of care for in-
fants and young children by contributing to improv-
ing the qualifications of childcare staff.
At the same time, legislators took a further decisive
step with the creation of a childcare allowance for
families where the mother worked outside the home.
This decision was particularly symbolic in that it also
decreed that the Single Salary Allowance would hence-
forth only be granted to low-income families. Within
this context, crèches, recreational centres and holi-
day camps for employees’ children were also organ-
ised by several companies at the instigation of their
respective works committees.
In the second half of the 1970s the rise in the num-
ber of crèche places and the increasing attendance of
young children at nursery school (“école mater-
nelle”) finally gave a decisive impetus to policies that
were beginning to integrate the “working mother”
model. The 1977 law allowed registered “childmin-
ders”, restricted until then by the vagueness and
ambiguity of their positions, access to proper
employee status and its associated rights. This law
also marked the first steps leading to social recogni-
tion of the importance of the quality of childcare;
emphasis was placed on the child’s intellectual andemotional awakening, in order to encourage its gen-
eral sense of “well-being”.
Militant action and information campaigns organ-
ised by the National Association of Nursery Nurses,
doctors in the Protection Maternelle et Infantile (a
statutory service responsible for health care of chil-
dren aged under six years and supervising crèches
and registered childminders) and psychologists were
beginning to bear fruit. The early socialisation of
young children was promoted by stressing that
crèches were an “ideal” preparation for entry into
nursery school. When the left came to power at the
beginning of the 1980s, trade unionists and political
decision-makers spoke increasingly of the need to
develop a childcare policy to assist “mothers” to
combine work and family life. The progressive con-
struction of policy orientated towards working par-
ents interacted with the change in women’s attitudes
vis-à-vis paid work in a snowball effect that resulted
in a rise in the number of working mothers.
The existence of the école maternelle, an institution
created in the late nineteenth century under the
Third Republic, added to the growing movement in
favour of public responsibility for young children
(Morgan 2002). Nearly a third of children aged un-
der three and 100 percent of those aged three to six
now attend this free, full-day école maternelle.T h e
presence of a canteen and out-of-school-hours care
centre have enabled more mothers to work full-time.
Furthermore, local authorities have considerably
developed recreational activities (leisure centres, for
example) to keep schoolchildren occupied on Wed-
nesday afternoons or after school using financial as-
sistance from the local CAFs.
Childcare policies: A tool to fight unemployment?
As far as childcare policies are concerned, France is
much more similar to the Nordic countries than to
Germany:in comparative and cross-national research,
France is always one of the cluster of countries with
policies that provide extensive support for maternal
employment (Gornick and Meyers 2003, FFGHC
2004). Childcare policies are based on the principle
that children are considered as both private and pub-
lic goods.And there is a strong consensus that respon-
sibility for children should be shared between the
family and the state, which is expected to intervene
not only to help families but also to protect children.
The move towards individualized childcare arrange-
ments
From 1991 to 2002 the number of places in crèches
rose from 112,000 to 203,000. Despite efforts by the
CNAF (in the form of financial assistance) to
encourage local authorities to develop this type of
provision, the supply of places still falls short of de-
mand; only 10 percent of children aged under three
are cared for in crèches. This shortage of places is
detrimental for low-income families. For them, it is
the cheapest childcare arrangement as fees in crèch-
es are income-related and they cannot afford to rely
on other formal child care arrangements, such as a
nanny at home or a registered childminder, even if
child care allowances help them to reduce the costs.
This represents a sharp departure from one of the
principles guiding public action in childcare policy:
to give all children equal opportunities, irrespective
of their social background.
Since the beginning of the nineties,the changes asso-
ciated with increasing flexibility at the workplace (in
particular the development of flexible work sched-
ules) have led to rising demand for flexible forms of
child care arrangements. In the context of rising un-
employment, the government (under the regime
headed by Premier Balladur,a member of one of the
right-wing parties in power) therefore decided, in
1994, to exploit the job-creating potential of the
childcare sector, and to dramatically increase both
child care allowances and special tax breaks to help
families meet the costs of “individualised” child care
arrangements (childminders and home helps).It was
the hope of the government to encourage families
with young children to create employment and at the
same time to bring more domestic workers into the
formal economy. Adopting the rhetoric of “free
choice for parents”, and of “diversification of child-
care arrangements”, successive governments have
begun to use family policy as a tool to fight unem-
ployment.
As a matter of fact, with the aim of decreasing the
unemployment rate, the government decided, in the
same Family Law of 1994, to encourage economical-
ly active parents (in reality mothers) having a second
child to opt for “staying-at-home” after maternity
leave by providing them with an Allocation Parentale
d’Education (APE, Child Rearing Benefit), a flat-
rate benefit, on the condition that they stop working
or work on a part-time basis. Since 2004, working
parents with only one child are also entitled to this
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benefit but only for six months after the maternity or
paternity leaves.To be eligible to this benefit,parents
are required to have worked or be registered as
unemployed before the birth. Despite a gender-neu-
tral discourse,98 percent of beneficiaries are women.
This scheme is very successful among low paid moth-
ers.This current situation bears witness to the ambi-
guities of family policy; measures geared at working
parents are being implemented in tandem with
incentive for mothers to stop working for a certain
period of time, at least until the child is three years
old. As a result, since the nineties, the increase in
funds allocated by the CNAF towards crèches has
been modest when compared with the much higher
funding allocated to childcare carried out by individ-
uals and to the APE.
Nevertheless, unlike Germany, it is currently quite
socially acceptable for a child under three years of
age to be taken care of in public day care facilities
for the whole day while his/her parents are at work
(Fagnani 2004). Early socialisation is even consid-
ered to be of great value, particularly by the educat-
ed middle classes. In fact the image of the crèche
benefited from a long tradition, stretching back to
the nineteenth century, of public responsibility for
young children (Morgan 2002).In total,in dual-earn-
er families, approximately seven out of ten children
under three years of age attend either a crèche or
nursery school or are the subject of subsidised child-
care, whether this be a paid childminder or help in
their own home or one of the two parents receiving
the Child Rearing Benefit. All these figures are
already beyond the targets for 2010 that were set at
the European Summit of Barcelona held in 2002.
This large range of policies and schemes in favour of
the work/life balance enables a better understanding
of differences in mothers’ labour force participation
between European countries. France, along with
Scandinavian countries, has one of the highest activ-
ity rates for women with children, whereas in the
UK, Germany or the Netherlands, one-and-a-half
earner households are the current norm. In France,
among the majority of dual-earner couples with chil-
dren, both partners work full-time.
For both economic and cultural reasons and as a
result of the struggles by the women’s movement,
family policy has progressively integrated the “work-
ing mother model” and the range of measures to help
working parents has recently been expanded yet
again. Public expenditures in favour of the develop-
ment of child care arrangements and parental leaves
have dramatically increased over the last two decades.
Despite the slowdown in its expansion, the system of
public crèches has not faced funding cutbacks.On the
other hand, the progressive introduction of measures
and schemes to support “working mothers” and the
modernisation of child rearing norms have coalesced
to justify in the eyes of couples,and more particularly
women, both having children and being present on
the labour market (Fagnani 2004). This also helps to
account for why fertility rates in France are well
above the EU average. This is partly attributable to
the fact that women do not feel obliged to choose
between childrearing and pursuing a career (Fagnani
2002). Where childcare norms are concerned, as a
result of an interactive process,the attitudes of French
women are in tune with the premises of family policy.
Recently under the socialist government, a serious
attempt to change the gender relations of care within
families was made; official rhetoric on family issues
emphasised the right of both parents to be present
with a newborn baby. This resulted in the decision to
extend paternity leave (paid at full rate under a certain
ceiling by health insurance) from three to fourteen
days from January 2002. This was aimed at encourag-
ing a less unequal division of unpaid work within cou-
ples. However, research has provided evidence that
policies governments have been introducing since the
eighties still fall short of a strong gender-egalitarian
approach.Lingering assumptions about gender under-
pin the notion that it is legitimate for mothers to work
full time unless they remain primarily responsible for
managing everyday family life. Even in full-time dual-
earner couples, working mothers are still expected to
be less committed to their job than their partner.
This enduring asymmetry between sexes in the fam-
ily partly explains the persistence of gender discrim-
ination in the labour market. Moreover, the caring
job sector remains largely female-dominated:in pub-
lic childcare facilities, staffs are only female. Child-
minders and home helpers are also women. This
maintains the idea that caring is only a woman’s
issue. Moreover, except in public childcare facilities,
care jobs are poorly qualified and low paid.
Conclusion
Because of intimate links to employment policy and
in a context of cost-containment, policies aimed athelping working parents are torn between the politi-
cal will to promote gender equality and the social
need to fight unemployment.The increase in means-
tested benefits also mirrors the growing concern
over social inequalities.As a result,criticisms of com-
plexity and lack of clarity are more and more fre-
quent. Corporatism and conflicting interests explain
why successive government attempts to simplify the
family benefit system have resulted in only piece-
meal measures which have reinforced rather than
reduced complexity.
Significant shifts have occurred over the last three
decades,in particular since the beginning of the 1990s,
in the area of maternal employment support,but fam-
ily policy has become too complex and is still fluctu-
ating between different and sometimes antagonistic
objectives, a phenomenon which weakens its efficien-
cy, its coherence and corrodes its social legitimacy.
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